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Abstract It has been realized that none of the three basic theories of capital structure
presents a complete answer to the actual determinants of corporate financing decisions.
This study attempts to model the practice of capital structure decisions according to the
basic premises of each theory of capital structure: trade-off theory, pecking-order theory
and free cash flow theory. The methodology addresses modeling long-term and short-term
debt financing decisions based on ten different statistical criteria using data from Egypt
stock market. The empirical evidence indicates that four models of corporate financing are
influenced by the trade-off theory relatively. The contributions of this paper are as follows.
First, this study offers a more refined and comprehensive methodology for modeling firms’
capital structure decisions. Second, the results of this study compare to those of previous
studies of other developing countries and thus add an element of external validity.
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1 Introduction
The literature on the theory and practice of capital structure is extensive. Researchers have
attempted to provide answers to such questions as what are the factors that affect firm’s
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decision to change its capital structure (e.g., leverage or debt ratio). The research on the
determinants of capital structure has provided a wide range of factors that combine the
effects of trade-off theory, pecking order theory and free cash flow theory (Chen and Kim
1979; Myers 2001; Sa´nchez-Vidal and Martin-Ugedo 2005). This research has been ori-
ented to determine the factors that matter (or do not matter) in explaining variations in
firms’ capital structure (Miller 1988). The empirical research on tests of theories of capital
structure follows standard, and mostly conventional, estimation procedures to examine the
critical determinants of capital structure according to the premises of a certain theory.
These procedures rely on the standard statistical runs that depend on conventional criteria
for choosing certain model(s). To that end, this study extends the statistical procedures by
employing comprehensive statistical criteria to choose the model that best reflects the
practice of debt financing.
In reality, it is hard to assume that corporate financing decisions are made according
to the precise assumptions of a certain capital structure theory. Rather, it is more tol-
erable to assume that corporate financing decisions are affected by many different factors
(internal and external) that require further investigation. Myers (2001) states that the
three theories of capital structure are ‘conditional’ in a sense that each works out under
its own assumptions and propositions. Therefore, none of the three theories can give a
complete picture of the practice of the determinants of corporate financing (capital
structure) decisions. That is, in practice, it is expected that when the business conditions
change, the financing decisions and strategies may change, moving from one theory to
another. For example, in certain times, the tax rate may be high enough to encourage
more debt financing to take advantage of tax savings or tax shields (trade-off theory).
When some economic factors change and the tax shields are not that encouraging, the
firm may seek financing from internal sources (pecking order theory) until the tax
conditions favor more borrowing. Moreover, a firm may deliberately consume the free
cash flow (when it heavily depends on internal sources of financing to finance investment
projects) to prevent the agency problems from arising. In sum, it is easily observable that
two or more theories of capital structure may exist and affect corporate financing
strategies at the same time. This requires more investigation of the factors or determi-
nants that actually affect corporate financing decisions. This paper examines number of
determinants of capital structure that have been considered proxies for each of the three
theories of capital structure.
1.1 Why modeling capital structure in transition market?
The search for the most reliable and relevant determinants of capital structure in a
transition market is particularly significant for certain reasons. First, compared with
developed markets, the stock markets in transitional countries are relatively less efficient
which raises the importance of searching for the most reliable factors that determine the
practice of capital structure decisions. Second, information asymmetry in transitional
markets is relatively higher than that of developed markets. This means that the capital
structure decisions may not be foreseen. This requires an examination of the financial
factors that help lessen the degree of asymmetry. Third, in a stage of transition, the
countries’ capital markets are quite influenced by global forces mostly from developed
markets. This raises the question of the extent to which the determinants of capital
structure that have evolved in developed markets have an influence generally in a
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transition market and particularly in Egypt. According to the three reasons mentioned
above, the paper tests the hypothesis that:
Due to transitional markets less efficiency, information asymmetry and global con-
vergence, capital structure decisions in transition markets are relatively influenced by
the three theories of capital structure.
The methodology of this paper utilizes a model selection approach to determine the most
common factors that are associated with firm’s capital structure decision. The basic
objective of the paper is to choose a group of factors (or determinants) that affects firms’
debt financing decisions the most. This group can be viewed as a model that describes
the practice of firm’s financing decisions. This process is to do with modeling firms’
capital structure decisions. In regression analysis, modeling depends on selecting a group
(or subset) of factors according to number of statistical criteria. That is, in regression
analysis, the subset selection of predictors that should be used is an important problem
when building a regression model. In general, the reasons for subset selection include (1)
identifying important and negligible predictors; (2) modeling the relationship between
the dependent variable and the predictors as simply as possible; (3) minimizing cost of
prediction. Several subset selection criteria have been proposed in the statistics literature.
These criteria select the subset that minimizes a quantity usually expressed as the log-
arithm maximum likelihood residual sum of squares plus a penalty function which
depends on the subset size. Different penalty functions result in different criteria. The
most popular criteria are Akaike’s Information Criterion AIC (Akaike 1973), Bayes
Information Criterion BIC (Schwarz 1978) and Cp (Mallows 1973). For a good survey
see Hocking (1976), Draper and Smith (1981) and Miller (1990) among others. In this
study we employ ten subsets selection criteria (which are discussed in Sect. 5) to identify
the most common determinants that are highly associated with firm’s capital structure
decisions.
The contribution of this paper can be outlined in two elements: (a) it is the first
attempt to employ subset selection criteria for capital structure modeling in a transition
market, (b) In this study, the authors employ ten subsets selection criteria, while
recently, using data from a developed market, Frank and Goyal (2004) present a study
of choosing the most reliable determinants of capital structure. They used only one
criterion, which is the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), for the purpose of subset
selection. It is worth to note that the ten criteria we employ in the present study offer a
relatively high refined modeling process. It is worth to note that the authors focus in the
literature review on the determinants of capital structure in developed markets mostly
the U.S. This has significant implications to transition markets. That is, since in general
the financial institutions and infrastructure in transition markets vary from those of the
developed markets, it offers an opportunity for the financial managers in transition
markets, particularly Egypt, to learn lesson from developed markets regarding the
determinants of capital structure that are to be considered ‘relevant’ to transitional
market settings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature
on the determinants of capital structure. Section 3 describes the research variables and
the proxies. Section 4 describes the data used and the methodology employed for the
modeling purpose. Section 5 discusses the ten subsets selection criteria used for the
modeling process. Section 6 shows the results. Section 7 discusses the results. Section 8
concludes.
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2 Determinants of capital structure: review of the relevant literature
The relevant literature on the determinants of capital structure provides number of factors
that have been examined or even pointed out. It has been realized that the number of
factors differs from one study to another. Therefore, this study examines as a compre-
hensive number of determinants of capital structure as possible. These determinants cover
relatively the tradeoff theory, pecking order theory and free cash flow theory. Some
determinants could not be included due to the lack of relevant data. Table 1 summarizes
the capital structure determinants examined in this study and the ratio(s) or proxy for each
determinant.
3 Variables and research proxies
3.1 Dependent variables
The initial two dependent variables examined in this study are firms’ changes in long-term
debt ratio (DLTDR) and changes in short-term debt ratio (DSTDR). The measurement of the
two variables is to address firms’ adjustment to a target value. Therefore, the change in
long-term debt ratio is denoted to as Y1t = DLTDRt = LTDRt - LTDRt-1 and the change
in short-term debt ratio is denoted to as Y2t = DSTDRt = STDRt - STDRt-1.
Nevertheless, the practice of corporate debt financing might not seem as simple as its
classification into long-term and short-term components. Two potential problems may
arise. First, a potential substantial problem arises in that the changes in these two
variables are not independent. In particular, a given firm might have short-term debt
outstanding in year-end t which is due in year t + 1. In year t + 1, the firm might
borrow long-term debt in part to pay-off maturing short-term debt. In this case, the
change in short-term debt (a decrease) occurs simply because the short-term debt
matures, while the simultaneous change in the long-term debt (i.e., an increase) occurs
simply because the proceeds are needed to pay-off the maturing short-term debt. It is
worth noting that a great part of the debt financing pattern in Egypt is a good example of
the above mentioned scenario. To deal with this possibility, the authors experiment with
a third alternative dependent variable which is the change in all debt (denoted to as
Y3t = DDR = DRt - DRt-1).
Second, the use of short-term debt may create another potential problem. Myers (1977)
and Graham (1996) argue that firms may limit total debt, or use short-term debt, to
minimize underinvestment costs. This theory necessitates the examination of the effect of
short-term debt independently which is measured by a fourth dependent variable Y4t = the
ratio of short-term debt/Total debt.
3.2 Independent variables
The independent variables refer to the factors that affect firm’s debt policy. The authors
have covered a wide range of factors of capital structure that were examined in the
literature empirically. The independent variables are summarized in Table 1. The summary
statistics of the independent variables are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2 Summary statistics of variables used for modeling the capital structure decision
Variables Ratio/Proxy Mean SD Min Median Max
Long-term debt ratio DLTDRt -0.01 0.154 -2 0 1.358
Short-term debt ratio DSTDRt -0.02 0.427 -5.54 -0.1 3.165
Target debt ratio DEt+1 -0.01 0.38 -6.13 0.001 4.5
Average industry leverage DADRAVG -0.01 0.14 -0.54 -0.01 0.48
Structure of tangible assets FATAt 0.24 0.3 0.002 0.18 5.33
Relative tax effects DNDTAXt -0.02 0.23 -4.3 0 0.24




High MB 0.05 0.22 0 0 1
Average MB 0.29 0.45 0 0 1
Low MB 0.65 0.47 0 1 1
Bankruptcy risk DCRt 76.9 11.4 -8.8 3.01 25.3
Agency costs ERt 0.15 0.17 -0.01 0.11 1.8
Industry classification (IC)a IC1 0.03 0.17 0 0 1
IC2 0.01 0.10 0 0 1
IC3 0.09 0.29 0 0 1
IC4 0.08 0.28 0 0 1
IC5 0.06 0.24 0 0 1
IC6 0.06 0.24 0 0 1
IC7 0.07 0.26 0 0 1
IC8 0.13 0.33 0 0 1
IC9 0.22 0.41 0 0 1
IC10 0.07 0.26 0 0 1
IC11 0.10 0.31 0 0 1
Size (LnAssetst) Large size 0.3 0.46 0 0 1
Medium size 0.35 0.48 0 0 1
Small size 0.34 0.47 0 0 1
Profitability DEBITDAt -0.03 0.8 -12.2 -0.01 12.3
Financial flexibility REAt+1 0.21 0.24 0 0.16 4.1
Liquidity position DCashRt -0.31 6.2 -13.8 -0.001 1.9
Interest rate IRt 0.14 0.01 0.13 0.14 0.16
Timing effect DPEt 6.86 10.8 -41.5 0.02 20.6
Transaction costs DPRt 0.94 11.3 0 0.35 25.1
The two dependent variables are changes in long-term debt ratio (DLTDRt) and changes in the short-term
debt ratio (DSTDRt). The other variables are the independents. The data covers the years from 1998 to 2004.
The sample consists of 99 non-financial firms
a ICs are dummies for the industry type. IC1 = Agriculture & Fisheries; IC2 = Gas, Oil & Mining;
IC3 = Food & Beverages; IC4 = Mills & Storages; IC5 = Textiles, Garments & Consumers Goods;
IC6 = Paper, Packaging & Plastics; IC7 = Chemicals & Fertilizers; IC8 = Pharmaceuticals & Health
Care; IC9 = Building Materials, Cement & Contracting; IC10 = Engineering Industries & Electrical
Equipments; IC11 = Housing & Real Estate
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4 Data and methodology
4.1 Data
The data are obtained from many sources. The data related to firms’ income statement and
balance sheet are obtained from the firms’ annual reports, stock market authorities and
Kompass Egypt Financial Year Book (Fiani & Partners). The interest rate data is published
by the IMF: International Financial Statistics. The data cover seven years 1998–2004. The
total number of firms included in the study is 99 firms. The sample firms were selected
according to two criteria. First, the non-financial firms amongst the 100 actively trading
firms in Egypt stock market. Second, those non-financial firms amongst the 100 firms with
the highest market value.
4.2 Methodology
The methodology in this paper aims at selecting the most important factors that affect
firms’ long-term debt ratio and short-term debt ratio. The authors employ ten model
selection criteria to choose the best subset predictors of the capital structure decisions.
Then, the subset which is selected by the maximum number of criteria is chosen to be the
identified subset, e.g., the model that shows the group of factors (predictors) that affects the
actual financing (capital structure) decision.
5 The statistical modeling approach: the subset selection criteria
Over the last three decades, several subset selection criteria have been proposed and
studied in the linear regression models. These criteria have two basic elements. The first
element is a function of error variance estimator which measures the goodness of fit. The
second is a function of the number of unknown parameters which penalizes overfitting. In
general, most selection criteria minimize the quantity:
Criteria ¼ n logðRSSmÞ þ dmF ð1Þ
where n is the sample size, RSSm is the minimum least squares’ residual sum of squares for
the model with m predictors which is equal to




where b^ is the minimum least squares estimates of the model parameters. The constant dm
is the number of parameters m in the model. The constant F represents the penalty imposed
to the RSSm for each additional parameter used in the model. It is worth noting that
different penalty constants result in different selection criteria.
5.1 The adjusted coefficient of determination (Ra
2)
The adjusted coefficient of determination Ra
2 is defined as follows:
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where p is the number of parameters and TSS is the total sum of squares which is equal
toTSS ¼P yt  yð Þ2;y is the sample mean. The adjusted coefficient of determination may
decrease when adding a variable to the model since the reduction in RSS may be more than
offset by the loss of a degree of freedom in the denominator n - p. Therefore, the model
with the highest Ra
2 is identified as the best model.
5.2 Mallows’ criterion (Cp)
Mallows (1973) defines the Cp statistic as:
Cp ¼ RSSm
S2
 ðn  2mÞ
where S2 is the estimate for the residual variance given by S2 ¼ RSSp

n  p and p is the
total number of predictors. The Cp criterion identifies the subset of predictors with the
smallest Cp value (Mallows 1973; Miller 1990).
5.3 Akaike’s information criterion (AIC)
The Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) is proposed by Akaike (1973) as a statistic
incorporating Kullback-Leibler information with the use of maximum likelihood principles
and negative entropy. The AIC is one of the most popular criteria for model selection. It is
defined as:
AIC ¼ n logðRSSmÞ þ 2dm
It is clear that the AIC is a special case of (1) when F = 2. The AIC identifies the subset
with the smallest AIC value. The AIC tends to overestimate the dimension of the model
(Akaike 1973; Miller 1990).
5.4 Bayes information criterion (BIC)
Schwarz (1978) proposed the Bayes information criterion (BIC) as a Bayesian solution to
the model selection problem. The BIC was derived as a large sample approximation of
Bayes factor using the posterior-probability criterion and evaluating the leading terms of its
asymptotic expansion. Schwarz assumed a fixed penalty for guessing the wrong model and
considered an infinite sequence of nested models each of which has a non-zero prior
probability. The BIC is a special case of (1) when F = log(n), that is:
BIC ¼ n logðRSSmÞ þ logðnÞdm
The BIC identifies the subset with the minimum value. When the number of observations is
large, BIC penalizes additional parameters much more than AIC, leading to more parsi-
monious models. In large samples, BIC is equivalent to a Bayesian procedure that selects
the model with the highest posterior (Schwarz 1978; Miller 1990).
5.5 Final prediction error (FPE)
Akaike (1969) proposed the FPE to select the best subset by choosing the model that
minimizes a form of prediction mean squared error. This criterion is defined as:
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where S2 is the estimate for the residual variance given by S2 ¼ RSSp

n  p and p is the
total number of predictors. According to Akaike’s theory, in a collection of different
models, the chosen model is the one with the smallest FPE.
5.6 Hannan and Quinn criterion (HQ)
Following a similar approach to Akaike (1969, 1973), Hannan and Quinn (1979) suggested
a penalty term as loglogn. Hannan and Quinn’s criterion (HQ) is defined as:
HQ ¼ n logðRSSmÞ þ log log ndm
HQ criterion is consistent, in a sense that it ensures that the actual model will be selected
with probability unity as the sample size increases. HQ is a special case of (1) when
F = loglogn.
5.7 Smith and Spiegelhalter criterion (SSC)
Smith and Spiegelhalter (1980) employed Bayesian approach for model selection. They
showed an approximate correspondence between Bayes factors and criterion (1) when
F = 1.5. The SSC is defined as:
SSC ¼ n logðRSSmÞ þ 1:5dm
5.8 Shibata criterion (SC)
Shibata (1980) investigated the asymptotic efficiency of AIC and showed that, when the
true model has infinite dimension, AIC is efficient as the sample size approaches infinity.
Shibata’s criterion (SC) is defined as:
SC ¼ n logðRSSmÞ þ n logðn þ 2dmÞ
It is worth noting that SC is a special case of (1) when F ¼ n logðn þ 2dmÞ=dð Þ. The SC
identifies the subset with the smallest SC value (Shibata 1980; Miller 1990).
5.9 Risk inflation criterion (RIC)
George and Foster (1994) proposed the Risk Inflation Criterion (RIC) which minimizes
RIC ¼ n logðRSSmÞ þ 2p logðdmÞ
The RIC asymptotically minimizes the maximum predictive risk inflation when the
predictors are orthogonal. In addition, the RIC is conservative since it is related to
the expected size of the largest t-statistic when all predictors are orthogonal and
their coefficients are zeros (George and Foster 1994; Foster and George 2000; Miller
1990).
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5.10 Bias-variance criterion (BIVAR)
Young (1982) suggested the Bias-Variance BIVAR Criterion as a weighted mean of
Mallows’ criteria Cp and the number of parameters dm. The BIVAR is defined as:
BIVAR ¼ wCp þ ð1  wÞdm
where w is a constant weight. In this study we set w = 0.5.
6 Results
It is worth noting that the ten criteria are monotone functions of the residual sum of squares
RSS for subsets with the same number of predictors. That is, the best subset is the one that
minimizes RSS for each size r, where r = 1,2,…,P - 1. Nevertheless, the direct search for
the subsets with minimum RSS by visiting all possible subsets is impractical since the
number of candidate subsets increases exponentially with the number of predictors. In fact,
in our case where 28 predictors are considered, the direct search for best subsets takes
22 days!, using a Pentium 4, 2400 MH PC.
Other authors such as Furnival and Wilson (1974) and Hocking (1976) have developed
elegant procedures which reduce the amount of computations required for examining a
subset and avoid examining all possible subsets. The Minitab package reports the subsets
with the maximum R2 (or equivalently with minimum RSS) for each number of predictors.
Then, a Matlab macro is written by the authors to compute the other criteria (which are not
reported by Minitab) where RSS is used as an input in the Matlab macro.
6.1 How does the subset selection work?
This section shows the empirical results of the statistical modeling of the determinants of
long-term debt and short-term debt. This section is organized as follows. First, according to
the statistical modeling process, it describes how the subset selection is done. The results of
the statistical modeling of long-term and short-term debt ratios are presented in Tables 3
and 4. Second, this section shows the results of the potential use of short-term debt to
minimize underinvestment costs which are presented in Table 5 and the results of the
potential overlap between short-term and long-term debt are presented in (6).
Table 3 shows the subset of predictors that influence the long-term debt financing. In
Table 3, each column represents the selected model by one criterion while each row
represents the status of the corresponding predictor selected by each criterion. When a
predictor is included in the selected model by one criterion, a check mark H is put in the
intersection cell of the predictor’s row and the criterion’s column.
In search for the candidate group (subset) of determinants of long-term debt financing,
two approaches are developed. The first approach is to search for the criteria that include
the same number of variables. Table 3 shows that there are two candidate subsets of
determinants of long-term debt financing. Each of the two subsets is selected by three
criteria. The first subset is selected by Cp, FPE and BIVAR criteria and it includes the
variables DEt+1, FATAt, DNDTAXt, GTAt, MB1 (high growth opportunities), REAt+1, and
IRt. The second subset is selected by AIC, HQ and SSC criteria and it includes the
variables DEt+1, DADRAVG, FATAt, DNDTAXt, GTAt, MB1, REAt+1, and IRt. Note that the
second subset has one additional determinant which is average industry leverage
DADRAVG.
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The second approach for determining the candidate subset is to select the variables
which are selected by the maximum number of criteria. This is the approach preferred
and adopted by the authors. This can be done when the number of variables corre-
sponding to the elements in the last column ni: is greater than or equal a certain number.
When we choose the variables which are selected by 9 criteria or more we obtain the
same determinants of the first subset and the second subset is obtained when we select
the variables chosen by 6 or more criteria. Indeed, for this reason the second approach
outperforms the first one, considering that the major objective is to select the group of
predictors that conform to the maximum number of criteria. Accordingly, the first chosen
subset represents the group of determinants that affect the long-term debt financing
decision.
Table 3 Best subsets for long-term debt financing
Variables Model selection criteria ni
Ra
2 CP AIC BIC FPE HQ SSC SC BIVAR RIC
DEt+1 H H H H H H H H H 9
DADRAVG H H H H H H 6
FATAt H H H H H H H H H H 10
DNDTAXt H H H H H H H H H 9
GTAt H H H H H H H H H H 10
MB1 H H H H H H H H H 9
MB2 H H 2
DCRt H H 2
ERt H H 2
IC1 H H 2
IC2 H H 2
IC3 H H 2
IC4 H H 2
IC5 H H 2
IC6 H H 2
IC7 H H 2
IC8 H H 2
IC9 H H 2
IC10 H H 2








DEBITDAt H H H 3
REAt+1 H H H H H H H H H 9
DCashRt H H 2
IRt H H H H H H H H H 9
DPEt H H 2
DPRt H H 2
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The same procedures and approach are used in the case of short-term debt financing,
short-term debt/total debt and changes in total debt ratio. The results are shown in
Tables 3–6. Scanning the elements of Table 4 indicates that the identified subset for short-
term debt financing is selected by Cp, AIC and FPE criteria and it includes DEt+1, FATAt,
DNDTAXt, GTAt, IC7, DEBITDAt and IRt. The same identified subsets of predictors are
obtained if we choose the predictors that appear in the selected models of 8 criteria or more.
Therefore, this subset is chosen to represent the group of determinants that affect the short-
term debt financing decision. Similarly, the same procedures are employed to examine the
potential overlaps between long-term and short-term debt financing. The results are shown
in Table 5. In addition, the potential problem of using short-term debt to minimize the
underinvestment problem is examined and the results are presented in Table 6.
Table 4 Best subsets for short-term debt financing
Variables Model selection criteria ni
Ra
2 CP AIC BIC FPE HQ SSC SC BIVAR RIC
DEt+1 H H H H H H H H H 9
DADRAVG H H 2
FATAt H H H H H H H H H H 10
DNDTAXt H H H H H H H H H 9
GTAt H H H H H H H H H H 10
MB1 H H H 3
MB2 H H 2
DCRt H H 2
ERt H H 2
IC1 H H 2
IC2 H H 2
IC3 H H 2
IC4 H H 2
IC5 H H 2
IC6 H H 2
IC7 H H H H H H H H 8
IC8 H H 2
IC9 H H 2
IC10 H H 2








DEBITDAt H H H H H H H H H 9
REAt+1 H H 2
DCashRt H H 2
IRt H H H H H H H H 8
DPEt H H 2
DPRt H H 2
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7 Discussion
The results reported in Tables 3–6 are summarized in Table 7. The latter shows the most
common determinants of long-term debt and short-term debt chosen by the most criteria
employed by the modeling process. When one determinant is chosen by many criteria, it
means that the determinant is highly associated with the measure of capital structure, thus
the determinant is quite relevant to explain debt financing decisions in Egypt.
Table 7 indicates many aspects of the practice of corporate debt financing decisions.
First, five out of the seven ratios and/or proxies are considered common determinants of
Table 5 Best subsets the ratio of short-term debt/total debt
Variables Model selection criteria ni
Ra
2 CP AIC BIC FPE HQ SSC SC BIVAR RIC
DEt+1 H H 2
DADRAVG H H 2
FATAt H H H H H H H H H H 10
DNDTAXt H H 2
GTAt H H 2
MB1 H H H H H H H H H 9
MB2 H H H 3
MB3 H H H H H H H H H 9
DCRt H H H 3
ERt H H H H H H H H H H 10
IC1 H H H H H H H 7
IC2 H H H H H H H 7
IC3 H H 2
IC4 H H 2
IC5 H H H H H H H H H 9
IC6 H H 2
IC7 H H H 3
IC8 H H 2
IC9 H H H H H H H H H H 10
IC10 H H H H H H H H H 9
IC11 H H H H H H H H H H 10
Large-size
firms





DEBITDAt H H 2
REAt+1 H H H H H H H 7
DCashRt H H H 3
IRt H H 2
DPEt H H 2
DPRt H H H 3
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both long-term debt and short-term debt. These common determinants are equity/debt
ratio, fixed assets/total assets, non-debt tax shields, growth of total assets, and interest rates.
The robustness of this result is considered when the same predictors are examined with
regard to another alternative dependent variable, which is the change in total debt ratio.
The latter shows that three predictors (equity/debt ratio, fixed assets/total assets and growth
of total assets) out of the five common predictors are also determinants of the change in
total debt ratio. This result indicates a considerable resemblance between long-term and
short-term debts when making capital structure decisions. That is, short-term debt is
renewable and used on long-term basis as a source of long-term debt financing. This
supports the debt financing scenario mentioned earlier in the description of the dependent
Table 6 Best subsets for the changes in all debt
Variables Model selection criteria ni
Ra
2 CP AIC BIC FPE HQ SSC SC BIVAR RIC
DEt+1 H H H H H H H H H 9
DADRAVG H H 2
FATAt H H H H H H H H H H 10
DNDTAXt H H H 3
GTAt H H H H H H H H H H 10
MB1 H H H H H H H H H 9
MB2 H H 2
MB3 H H 2
DCRt H H 2
ERt H H 2
IC1 H H 2
IC2 H H 2
IC3 H H 2
IC4 H H 2
IC5 H H 2
IC6 H H 2
IC7 H H H H H H H 7
IC8 H H 2
IC9 H H 2
IC10 H H 3








DEBITDAt H H H H H H H H H 9
REAt+1 H H 2
DCashRt H H 2
IRt H H H 3
DPEt H H 2
DPRt H H 2
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variables and also comparable to the results of Spanish firms reported by Sa´nchez-Vidal
and Martin-Ugendo (2005).
Second, as for the long-term debt financing, the availability of good investment
opportunities in the market is one of the causes to change firm’s debt financing. In this
case, firms use both long-term debt and retained earnings to finance the available invest-
ment opportunities. Table 7 also shows an important aspect of the short-term debt
financing. That is, the availability of good investment opportunities (being proxied by high
MB ratio) supports Myers (1977) and Graham (1996) theory that firms may use short-term
debt financing to minimize underinvestment costs. As for the industry type, the results
show that short-term debt financing is considerably important to certain industries which
are the Chemicals & Fertilizers, textile & garments, building & contracting, engineering
and housing & real estate. In general, industry effects have been studied by Schwarz and
Aronson (1967), Gupta (1969), Lev (1969), Scott (1972), Schmidt (1976), Scott and Martin
(1975) and Ferri and Jones (1979). They all found significant industry effects on debt
ratios. Titman (1984) raised the magnitude of this relationship through studying the liq-
uidation decision where the results indicate that firms that make special products will find
liquidation costly. Titman and Wessels (1988) report a negative relationship between debt
ratios and the dummy variables that control for and refer to the firms that produce spe-
cialized products (such as machines and equipments). Contrary to Titman’s (1984)
prediction, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that high-tech firms, which are assumed to
produce specialized products, are less likely than other firms to limit debt for not giving
their customers and suppliers an impression that the firm may go out of business. The
results also show that firm’s profitability is not to be considered an exclusive determinant
of short-term debt financing decisions since it is a also a determinant to changes in total
debt ratio. This does not render profitability a robust determinant of short-term debt
financing.
Third, Table 7 shows important implications regarding the practice of theories of capital
structure. As Myers (2001) points out, the practice of corporate financing decisions could
be dominated by the combined effects of the three theories. The contribution of the subset
selection approach is to examine the dominant determinants (variables) influencing the
practice of debt financing decisions. The results show that in both cases of long-term debt
financing and short-term debt financing, the trade-off theory dominates relatively. The
trade-off theory assumes that the firm will borrow to a level that balances the tax
advantages and possible financial distress. Therefore, firm’s tax advantage (tax shield)
plays the dominant role in this theory.
The results show that, in the case of long-term and short-term debt financing, the effects
of ‘target debt ratio’ (using debt/equity ratio) and ‘tax shields’ (using non-debt tax shields)
reflect the robust effects of the ‘trade-off theory.’ The literature provides evidence on the
trade-off-related determinants of corporate debt financing. Modigliani and Miller (1963)
and Scott (1976) show the effects of corporate tax rate on firm’s debt policy. DeAngelo and
Masulis (1980) argue that there is a positive relationship in which firms subject to lower
corporation tax rates will employ less debt in their capital structure. Lasfer (1995) reports
the same positive relationship in the long-run, but no significant effect in the short-run.
Walsh and Ryan (1997) found that tax considerations are significant in determining debt
and equity decisions of the UK firms. In Toy et al.’s (1974) study, they found that exec-
utives regarded tax as a very important debt ratio determinant. The other survey conducted
by Graham and Harvey (2001) reports that tax advantage is of moderate importance for
medium-size firms, and of high importance for large, regulated dividend-paying firms (e.g.,
firms that have high corporate tax rates and, therefore, large tax incentives to use debt).
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Table 7 also shows the role of other determinants of capital structure. The first deter-
minant is the ‘assets tangibility’ being measured by the proxy ratio of fixed assets to total
assets. In this study, this determinant has robust effects on both firms’ long-term and short-
term debt financing. In this regard, this result is comparable to Tsai’s (2005) result that the
optimal capital structure tends to involve debt financing for firms with more value in tangible
assets. The literature on the theories of capital structure assumes that tangible assets are easy
to collateralize and thus they reduce the agency costs of debt (Myers and Majluf 1984; Stulz
and Johnson 1985; Harris and Raviv 1991; Rajan and Zingales 1995). The literature provides
some different results on the relationship between debt and fixed assets. On one hand, Toy
et al. (1974) show that corporate executives considered liquidity of assets a highly deter-
minant of debt ratio. Schmidt (1976) and Ferri and Jones (1979) found a negative correlation
between total debt and the proportion of fixed assets. On the other hand, the works of Galai
and Masulis (1976), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) provide evidence on
positive relationships between firm’s debt ratios and their collateralized assets. The exis-
tence of uncollaterable assets leads a firm to change its capital structure favoring equity
financing rather than debt financing. Grossman and Hart (1982) argue that higher collater-
alized debt levels prevent managers from over consuming firm’s perquisites. Myers and
Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) indicate that when managers have better information than
outside investors, the former find it advantageous to issue secured debt. In this regard, the
information managers have about their firms’ assets can positively affect assets collaterla-
bility if this information helps creditors exercising an effective monitoring role. Titman and
Wessels (1988) find an effect of assets’ collateral value on firm’s capital structure choice.
Martin and Scott (1974) and Ghosh et al. (2000) find the ratio of fixed assets to total assets a
positive and significant determinant of firm’s capital structure.
The next determinant that affects both long-term and short-term debt financing is firm’s
growth being proxied in this study by growth of total assets. The agency theory argues on the
existence of a negative relationship between firm’s expected future growth and long-term
debt levels. As the agency theory states, equity-controlled firms have a tendency to invest
suboptimally to expropriate wealth from bondholders and the cost associated with this agency
relationship is likely to be higher for growing firms. This negative relationship has been
reached by Kim and Sorensen (1986), Harris and Raviv (1991) and Ghosh et al. (2000).
Nevertheless, Gupta (1969) and Toy et al. (1974) found that total debt ratios were positively
related to growth measured by sales growth and asset turnover. Graham and Harvey’s survey
(2001) shows that many growth firms claim that customers might not purchase their products
if they are worried that debt usage might cause the firm to go out of business. This is consistent
with Titman’s theory (1984) if growth firms produce unique products.
Although, the results in Table 7 show that market interest rate is a common determinant
of both long-term and short-term debt financing, the effect of interest rates disappeared
with regard to change in total debt ratio. This does not render interest rate a robust
determinant of debt financing.
The results show that the long-term debt financing is also affected by the existence of
much investment growth opportunities being proxied by the MB ratio. Table 7 shows that
the high MB ratio is chosen as a determinant of long-term debt financing. The literature
includes number of works that relate changes in firm’s capital structure to the available
growth options, hence investment opportunities. The latter are affected by the presence of
long-term debt, which can cause an agency conflict between bondholders and shareholders
(Myers 1977). That is, shareholders may underinvest if they perceive that the income will be
used to pay off existing debt holders. This indicates a negative relationship between firm’s
debt and growth opportunities. Barclay et al. (1995) indicate that the most important
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systematic determinant of a company’s capital structure and dividend yield would appear to
be the extent of its investment opportunities. Myers (1977) and Graham (1996) argue that
firms may limit total debt, or use short-term debt to minimize underinvestment costs. This is
quite obvious in Table 7 since the high MB ratio is a determinant of changes in total debt
ratio as well. This result comes in contrast to the results of other studies that debt usage is
inversely related to growth options. Myers (1984), Williamson (1988) and Harris and Raviv
(1990) argue on the relationship between growth opportunities, bankruptcy costs and
financial leverage. They argue that the expected bankruptcy costs are higher for firms with
greater growth opportunities. This leads to the conclusion that larger expected bankruptcy
costs would in turn imply lower financial leverage. Titman and Wessels (1988) present
additional evidence in which they argue that firms in growing industries incur higher agency
costs since they have more flexibility in taking future investments. Lasfer (1995) provides
evidence on the inverse relationship that firms with fewer growth opportunities have more
debt in their capital structure. Rajan and Zingales (1995) found a negative correlation
between market-to-book ratio and leverage driven by firms with high market-to-book ratios
rather than by firms with low market-to-book ratios. This indicates that it is unlikely that
financial distress (high leverage), which is associated with firms with low market-to-book
ratios, is responsible for the negative correlation as suggested by Fama and French (1992).
Lucas and McDonald (1990), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and
Hovakimian et al. (2001) present another reason for the market-to-book ratio to be nega-
tively correlated with book leverage that stems from the tendency for firms to issue stocks
when their stocks price is high relative to earnings or book value. Ozkan (2001) presented
further evidence on the negative and statistically significant relationship between growth
opportunities and leverage. According to his explanation, this negative relationship may give
support to the prediction that firms, which have a relatively large proportion of intangible
assets can not support a high leverage ratio. Nevertheless, Ozkan found a positive and
statistically significant relationship between the lagged growth and leverage. He argues that
the positive effect may happen because growth has a transitory effect on leverage ratios.
It is quite interesting to note that the results reported in Table 7 show considerable
similarities and convergence with Booth et al.’s study (2001) of the determinants of capital
structure in other ten developing countries but Egypt was not included in the sample
countries. In the case of Egypt, Eldomiaty and Ismail (2004, 2005) and Eldomiaty (2004)
have reached similar results about sample of Egyptian firms using the Bayesian method-
ology which stands on very different assumptions from the assumptions of the subset
selection procedure employed in the present study. The converging and matchable results
of those studies, therefore, add to the contribution of this paper since the methodology used
in this study is quite different from the ones used in the other related studies mentioned
earlier. This also shows a significant element of external validity of the results reported in
this study as well as the other related studies. In addition, the matching results of this study
and other related studies provide another support to what Booth et al. (2001) have con-
cluded that the theory of capital structure is ‘portable.’ That is, corporate financing
decisions in developing markets are influenced relatively by many determinants of capital
structure that have evolved in developed markets.
8 Conclusion
The literature on the theories of capital structure has provided wide range of factors that
can be used to describe the practice of corporate financing strategies. This paper is the first
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attempt to employ the methodology of model selection for determining the relevant
determinants of debt financing decisions in transition markets in general and in Egypt in
particular. The methodology used in this paper presents evidence that two models of
corporate debt financing (long-term and short-term debt financing) show a robust influence
of the trade-off theory. The final results can be considered as a first-order analysis to further
examine the conditions under which firms’ financing decisions and strategies are made and
moving from one theory to another. The contribution of the paper is that the reported
results converge relatively and considerably to the results of other related studies in
developing markets, which is considered an element of external validity. This is true since
the methodologies employed in the other related studies differ from the one used in the
present study. The results have also empirical considerations since they show the relevant
determinants of capital structure to the Egyptian capital market. These determinants are
recommended to the practitioners when making debt financing decisions.
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